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Note 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc.: Aiding and Abetting Liability 
Under the Alien Tort Statute 
James Morrissey 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and several 
individuals filed suit in United States Federal Court against 
Talisman Energy, Inc. (Talisman).1 The plaintiffs alleged that 
Talisman was complicit in the Sudanese government’s human 
rights abuses against largely non-Muslim Sudanese civilians 
living in the area of the company’s oil concession.2 The plaintiffs 
alleged that the Sudanese government orchestrated an armed 
campaign of murder, rape and massive civilian displacement in 
order to clear the way for oil exploration.3 On October 2, 2009, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its 
opinion in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 
Inc.4 Upholding the lower court’s ruling of summary judgment 
in favor of defendant Talisman, the Second Circuit set a high 
bar for plaintiffs who seek to use the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) to 
 
 1. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 251 
(2d Cir. 2009). 
 2. See id. at 248–51 (noting that civilians represented by plaintiff were living 
in areas of land proximate to Talisman’s oil concession). 
 3. See David Glovin, Talisman Court Upholds Genocide Suit Dismissal, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2009, 14:20EDT), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601082&sid=av47UyrplgEQ (linking 
defendants’ alleged human rights violations to oil exploration); BUSINESS & HUMAN 
RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, Case Profile: Talisman Lawsuit (re Sudan), 
http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/LLawsuitsregulatoryactio/LawsuitsSelecte
dcLaws/TalismanlawsuitreSudan (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (listing alleged human 
rights violations of Talisman). 
 4. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 244. 
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hold foreign defendants accountable for aiding and abetting 
violations of international law.5 The court determined that 
Talisman could not be held liable for aiding and abetting 
violations of international law committed by the Sudanese 
government unless the plaintiffs could prove that Talisman 
purposefully aided the government’s alleged human rights 
violations.6 
The pivotal issue in this case was determining the 
appropriate mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability 
under customary international law, and therefore in ATS cases.7 
The court’s holding on this issue is particularly important 
because of the increasing use of the ATS as a means to bring 
civil actions against corporate defendants alleging that they 
have committed violations of international law in foreign 
nations.8 
This Comment seeks to show that the Second Circuit 
incorrectly determined that aiding and abetting under 
customary international law requires a mens rea of purpose 
when, in fact, international law dictates that the requisite mens 
rea standard is knowledge. Part I explains the events that 
precipitated the plaintiffs’ cause of action in Talisman and 
examines relevant sources of customary international law. Part 
II details the Second Circuit’s decision and reasoning in 
Talisman. Finally, Part III analyzes relevant sources of 
international law and determines that customary international 
law dictates a mens rea standard of knowledge for aiding and 
abetting liability. 
 
 
 
 
 5. See id. at 247–48, 259. 
 6. Id. at 247–48. 
 7. Cf. id. at 256–60 (evaluating the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting 
in criminal liability and applying this analysis to international law norms). 
 8. See generally id. at 254–255 (noting that the ATS provided jurisdiction just 
once in the 170 years after its enactment, but has been used increasingly in recent 
decades). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF SUDAN 
V. TALISMAN ENERGY, INC. 
1.Conflict in the Sudan 
The seeds of the turmoil in the Sudan—which ultimately 
led to the plaintiffs’ claims in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
Talisman Energy, Inc.—were sown in 1956 when Sudan 
obtained its independence from Britain and Egypt.9 Almost 
immediately after achieving independence, civil war erupted 
between the Arab-dominated government based in the north 
and the non-Muslim African population of the south.10 In 1972, 
the two sides made a deal to apportion control and a period of 
relative peace ensued.11 However, this peace was shattered in 
1983 when hostilities erupted anew between the government 
and a southern rebel group named the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA).12 In 1991, the SPLA splintered into 
rival sects and fought the government as well as each other.13 
Although the government and several of the southern rebel 
groups were able to broker a peace agreement in 1997, by the 
end of 2000 this agreement had collapsed and conflict 
resumed.14 It is beyond question that during the course of 
Talisman’s work in Sudan, the amount of violence in southern 
Sudan substantially increased.15 
2. Oil Development in the Sudan 
In 1979, the petroleum company Chevron discovered a 
significant quantity of oil in southern Sudan. 16 In order to 
develop this lucrative resource, the Sudanese government 
 
 9. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 
248 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 10. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 248; see also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
Talisman Energy, Inc. (Talisman I), 453 F.Supp.2d 633, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(explaining in greater detail the civil wars after Sudan gained independence from 
Egypt), aff’d 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 11. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 248. 
 12. See Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 643. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 248. 
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granted rights to several foreign companies to develop six 
“blocks” of territory.17 By 1996, four oil companies formed a 
consortium that conducted business through a corporation 
called the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company Limited 
(GNPOC).18 In 1998, Talisman, a Canadian oil exploration 
company, purchased one of these companies, Arakis Energy 
Corporation (Arakis), thus acquiring a 25% stake in GNPOC.19 
However, before beginning operations in Sudan, the head of 
security for Arakis advised Talisman that its involvement would 
tip the military power balance in favor of the government.20 
3. Security Arrangements for GNPOC 
From 1999 to 2003 the government military forces in Sudan 
coordinated with GNOPC to provide security for the concession 
area.21 Examples of GNOPC and government collaborative 
efforts in the concession area included: the construction of roads 
linking the concession areas to military bases,22 GNOPC 
allowing the military to open garrisons within the concession,23 
and GNOPC upgrading two airstrips on the concession named 
Heglig and Unity.24 The military subsequently began using the 
Heglig airstrip as a “staging area”25 for combat operations in the 
surrounding territory, including offensive helicopter and bomber 
attacks against civilians.26 Furthermore, GNPOC personnel at 
both airports refueled military aircrafts, sometimes with 
 
 17. Id.; see also Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 643 (explaining in greater detail 
Sudan’s process for granting development rights on the territory in question). 
 18. See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 248. 
 19. Id. at 248–49. See generally Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 647 (providing 
relevant background information regarding the Talisman corporation). 
 20. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 249. The head of security for Arakis “advised 
Talisman that the oil fields were protected both by the military and by Government-
sponsored militias” and “opined that, though Talisman’s assistance would greatly 
advance oil exploration, it would tip the military balance in favor of the 
Government.’”) See id. 
 21. Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 649. 
 22. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 249. 
 23. Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 650 (noting further that when a garrison was 
constructed, local police forces were used and villages were abolished). 
 24. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 249–50. 
 25. Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 652. 
 26. See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 249–50 (noting that the airstrips were used by 
the government for offensive attacks in the area); see also Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d 
at 652 (stating that helicopters and bombers that refueled at Heglig were used by 
the government in civilian attacks). 
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GNPOC’s own fuel.27 In February of 2001, Talisman’s CEO, Jim 
Buckee, wrote to the Sudanese Minister of National Defense 
warning that the bombings being staged from the airstrips were 
“universally construed as violations of international 
humanitarian law” but later withdrew his objection to the 
government’s use of the airstrips after a missile attack on a 
GNPOC facility.28 
To further secure the oil field operations, the military 
created a “buffer zone” around GNPOC facilities by clearing key 
areas of civilian populations.29 In order to create this buffer 
zone, the military “forced people to leave villages by attacking 
the villages with any means necessary, including small arms 
fire, artillery, helicopter gunships and bombers.”30 Additionally, 
the former chief of military intelligence for the Sudan People’s 
Defense Force testified that the military “routinely attacked 
undefended civilian villages in the GNPOC oil concession to 
clear the area for oil exploration.”31 Internal Talisman reports 
contain evidence that they were aware of these forced 
displacements.32 
In response to these forced displacements, those affected 
sought to hold Talisman accountable. The plaintiffs in Talisman 
are current and former residents of southern Sudan who claim 
that they were victims of human rights abuses resulting from 
these government attacks to secure the oil fields.33 They brought 
suit against Talisman under the ATS,34 alleging that Talisman 
aided and abetted the government in the perpetration of those 
abuses.35 
 
 27. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 249–50. 
 28. Id. at 250 (stating that Buckee dropped his objections to the presence of 
military helicopter gunships at Heglig). 
 29. Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 650. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. (noting that the former chief of military intelligence for the Sudan 
People’s Defense Force was also the former chief of military intelligence for the 
Southern Sudanese Defense Force). 
 32. See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 250 (noting a 2002 report by a Talisman 
subsidiary concerning the buffer zone that stated “[t]he area within the security ring 
road while not a sterile area as found on security operations elsewhere . . . is moving 
in that direction.”). 
 33. Id. at 251. 
 34. See id. at 247. See generally Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 35. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 247–48 (noting that plaintiffs allege that Talisman 
aided and abetted or conspired with the government with respect to human rights 
abuses). 
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B. HOLDING CORPORATIONS LIABLE FOR AIDING AND ABETTING 
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UNDER THE ATS 
The First Congress of the United States enacted the ATS as 
part of the Judiciary Act in 1789.36 The text of the ATS states 
that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”37 However, 
this statute “quickly lapsed into desuetude.”38 In fact, for over 
170 years after its enactment it only provided jurisdiction in one 
case.39 
1. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
The only time that the Supreme Court has construed the 
meaning of the ATS is in the case Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.40 In 
Sosa, a Mexican national brought a claim under the ATS 
against the United States and another Mexican national, 
Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez).41 The plaintiff alleged that Alvarez, 
in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 
unlawfully abducted him from Mexico and transported him to 
the United States to stand trial for his alleged participation in 
the torture and murder of a DEA agent.42 
In determining the intention of the First Congress when it 
enacted the ATS, the Court looked to the historical context of 
the statute.43 The Court surmised that the inability of the 
Continental Congress to “cause infractions of treaties or of the 
law of nations to be punished” was the primary impetus for the 
ATS.44 Ultimately, the Court determined that the drafters 
 
 36. William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction Over Tort 
Committed In Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 467 (1986). 
 37. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 38. Casto, supra note 36, at 468. 
 39. Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). 
 40. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 255. 
 41. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–698 (noting that the plaintiff brought suit 
against another Mexican national, five Mexican civilians, four Drug Enforcement 
Agency personnel and the United States). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. at 714–720 (discussing relevant historical happenings in foreign and 
domestic affairs prior to the enactment of the ATS). 
 44. Id. at 716–717 (quoting JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 60 (E. Scott ed. 1893)) (“[T]his class of cases was intensified by the so 
called Marbois incident of May1784, in which a French adventurer, De Longchamps, 
verbally and physically assaulted the Secretary of the French Legion in 
Philadelphia.”). 
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understood the ATS to give federal courts jurisdiction over three 
types of offenses against the law of nations: “violation of safe 
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and 
piracy.”45 However, the Court was open to the possibility of new 
causes of actions based on the “present day law of nations,” so 
long as the claim is based on “a norm of international character 
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable [to the three causes of actions enumerated above].”46 
Ultimately, the Court concluded that “the door is still ajar 
subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class 
of international norms today.”47 
2. Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.48 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa made it 
clear that federal courts have authority to recognize causes of 
action based on modern interpretation of customary 
international law, the Court’s decision offered little guidance as 
to whether a defendant could be held liable for aiding and 
abetting under the ATS.49 Another significant issue left 
unresolved by the Court in Sosa was whether customary 
international law or federal common law provided the 
appropriate mens rea standard for aiding and abetting.50 In 
Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., the Second Circuit 
attempted to resolve this very issue.51 The plaintiffs in 
Khulumani brought claims under the ATS against 
approximately fifty corporate defendants and hundreds of 
corporate “Does” alleging that the defendants collaborated with 
the government of South Africa in order to maintain the 
apartheid system.52 
The Second Circuit found in a per curium opinion that a 
corporation can be sued under the ATS based on a theory of 
aiding and abetting, and therefore denied the corporate 
 
 45. Id. at 724. 
 46. Id. at 725 (alteration in original). 
 47. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. 
 48. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 49. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 286 (Hall, J., concurring). 
 50. Id. (“Sosa at best lends Delphian guidance on the question of whether the 
federal common law or customary international represents the proper source from 
which to derive a standard of aiding and abetting liability under the [ATS].”). 
 51. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 275–77 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 52. Id. at 258 (per curium). 
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defendant’s motion for summary judgment.53 However, the 
panel split on which body of law, federal common law or 
customary international law, governs the standard for aiding 
and abetting.54 Two of the circuit judges found that 
international law provided the standard for the scope of aiding 
and abetting liability,55 while one judge determined that 
domestic aiding and abetting laws should apply.56 In his 
concurring opinion, Judge Katzmann surveyed various sources 
of customary international law and concluded that there is “no 
source of international law that recognizes liability for aiding 
and abetting a violation of international law but would not 
authorize imposition of such liability on a party who acts with 
the purpose of facilitating that violation.57 
Ultimately, a majority of the circuit panel in Khulumani 
supported the conclusions that: (1) the appropriate source of an 
aiding and abetting standard under the ATS is customary 
international law and (2) in order to be liable for aiding and 
abetting a violation of international law, it is necessary for a 
defendant to purposefully facilitate the commission of the 
crime.58 
C. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS SOURCES 
When the Supreme Court stated that a claim brought under 
the ATS must be based on a “norm of international character 
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the [18th century paradigms recognized by the 
Court in Sosa],” it was referring to customary international 
law.59 Customary international law is law that “results from a 
general and consistent practice of States followed by them from 
 
 53. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260. See also Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and 
Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. 
RTS. 304, 320 (2008). 
 54. See Cassel, supra note 53, at 320–21 (explaining the schism between the 
circuit judges). 
 55. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 269 (Katzman, J., concurring); id. at 330 
(Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 56. Id. at 284 (Hall, J., concurring). 
 57. Id. at 277 (Katzman, J., concurring). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 267. See also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 
582 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e look primarily to the formal lawmaking and 
official actions of States and only secondarily to the works of scholars as evidence of 
the established practices of States.”) (quoting Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 
414 F.3d 233, 250 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
MORRISSEY Formatted - Fixed CDL 12/10/2010  2:13 PM 
152 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol. 20:1 
a sense of legal obligation.”60 State practice can take many 
forms, including “treaties and executive agreements, decisions of 
international and national courts and tribunals and decisions, 
declarations and resolutions of international organizations.”61 
Likewise, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice articulates several sources of customary international 
law a court should consider in determining what constitutes 
international law.62 These sources of law are: 
- international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states; 
- international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; 
- the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations; 
subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decision and 
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
the rules of law.63 
Therefore, in order to determine the appropriate mens rea 
standard for aiding and abetting, it is necessary to examine 
these sources of international law.64 
D. SOURCES OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING 
AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY 
1. International Tribunals 
a. Post World War II Trials at Nuremburg 
Following World War II, the Allies established the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg (Nuremburg 
Tribunal) and similar tribunals to hold those individuals 
responsible for violations of international law accountable. 65 
 
 60. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW NORMS, ACTORS PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 78 (2d ed. 2006) 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES). 
 61. Id. at 79. 
 62. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 1060. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 
U.S. 153, 160–61 (1820). 
 65. Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges of 
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The charter of the Nuremburg Tribunal was heralded as an 
authoritative statement of international law and the United 
Nations General Assembly later affirmed the principles of the 
charter and judgments of the Nuremburg Tribunal as definitive 
expressions of customary international law.66 
In addition to recognizing individual responsibility for 
complicity in war crimes,67 Allied prosecutors also sought to hold 
corporate executives liable for their role as accomplices.68 The 
most notable of these cases was the Zyklon B case in which 
German industrialists were held accountable as accomplices for 
selling insecticide used to kill prisoners held in concentration 
camps.69 The Nuremburg Tribunal thus established the first 
notion that corporate officers could be held liable for the actions 
of the corporation as an accomplice to violations of international 
law and the appropriate standard for assessing guilt for such a 
crime.70 
b. The ICTY and ICTR 
Following World War II there were few opportunities for an 
international tribunal to develop customary law regarding 
aiding and abetting liability.71 However, this changed when the 
United Nations Security Council created the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)72 and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)73 in the 
early 1990s to address the serious violations of international law 
which occurred in these States. The tribunals’ statutory 
provisions intended to “codify existing norms of customary 
 
Prosecuting Corporate Officials Whose Business Transactions Facilitate War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A.F. L. REV. 167, 169–70 (2005). 
 66. Id. at 170. 
 
 67. See 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 572–73 (1949). 
 68. Jacobson, supra note 65, at 174–75. 
 69. Cassel, supra note 53, at 308. 
 70. See id. at 306–07. 
 71. Jacobson, supra note 65, at 200. See also Paul Mysliwiec, Comment, 
Accomplice to Genocide Liability: The Case for a Purpose Mens Rea Standard, 10 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 389, 392 (2009) (describing how there were almost no prosecutions 
for genocide from the passage of the Genocide convention to the founding of the 
ICTY and ICTR). 
 72. U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 36, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 
3, 1993), adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
 73. S.C. Res. 955, annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
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international law” while the tribunals’ jurisdiction limited it to 
just enforcing these norms.74 Both the ICTY and ICTR ascribe 
criminal liability for anyone who “aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or execution” of genocide, war crimes, or 
crimes against humanity.75 Furthermore, both the ICTY and 
ICTR have produced decisions regarding the appropriate mens 
rea standard for aiding and abetting.76 
2. International Instruments: The ILC Draft Code and the Rome 
Statue of the International Criminal Court 
The United Nations created the International Law 
Commission (ILC) in 1947 for the “promotion of the progressive 
development of international law and its codification.”77 The 
members of the ILC are persons of “recognized competence in 
international law.”78 In the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind (Draft Code), the ILC 
clarifies what the international law standards are for “crimes 
under international law and punishable as such.”79 
The ICTY and ICTR were precursors to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) created by the Rome Statute.80 The 
 
 74. Cassel, supra note 53, at 307 (quoting The Secretary-General, Report of the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 29, 
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993)). See also YUSUF AKSAR, IMPLEMENTING 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: FROM THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS TO A 
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 (2004) (“[T]he ICTY and the ICTR 
have to apply the customary rules of international humanitarian law as far as the 
substantive law of the International Tribunal (in particular, the rules governing war 
crimes, the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity) are concerned.”). 
 75. Id. (citing U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General 
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), art.7.1, U.N. 
Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, supra note 73, art. 7.1.) 
 76. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, ¶236–49 (Dec.10, 1998), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/40276a8a4.pdf; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case 
No. ICTR–96–4–T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CAkayesu%5Cjudgement%5Cak
ay001.pdf. 
 77. Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 1 (Nov. 21, 1947), 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/statute/statute_e.pdf. 
 78. Id. at art. 2, ¶ 1. 
 79. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 1, ¶2 
(1996), [hereinafter Draft Code], 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/English/draft%20articles/7_4_1996.pdf. 
 80. United Nations Diplomatic Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, June 15–July 17, Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [Rome Statute]. 
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purpose of the ICC is to ensure that “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole . . . not go 
unpunished.”81 The jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary to 
national courts. As such, it only has jurisdiction over a matter 
when “national justice systems are unwilling or unable to do 
so.”82 The Rome Statute specifically prescribes criminal 
responsibility for an individual who aids or abets a war crime, 
crime against humanity, or genocide.83 
3. State Practice 
As discussed above, the general principals of law 
“recognized by civilized nations” play a crucial role in the 
formation of customary international law.84 In order to 
determine the proper mens rea standard for aiding and abetting 
under international law, it is helpful to assess the practice of 
other States, especially those which ascribe aiding and abetting 
liability for violations of international law. This Comment will 
examine the practices of several States infra part III(D). 
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION IN PRESBYTERIAN 
CHURCH OF SUDAN V. TALISMAN ENERGY, INC. 
In Talisman, the Second Circuit analyzed the various 
sources of customary international law discussed above in order 
to determine the appropriate mens rea standard for aiding and 
abetting liability.85 According to the Second Circuit, the 
“decisive issue” was whether liability for aiding and abetting 
human rights violations “can be imposed absent a showing of 
purpose” under customary law and, hence, an action brought 
under the ATS.86 
The Second Circuit’s analysis of the appropriate mens rea 
standard relied primarily on the concurring opinion of Judge 
Katzmann in Khulumani.87 The court quotes Judge Katzmann’s 
 
 81. Id. at Preamble. 
 82. Cassel, supra note 53, at 316 (citing Rome Statute, supra note 80 art. 17). 
 83. Rome Statute, supra note 80, at art. 25. 
 84. See Rome Statute, supra note 80, at art. 38. 
 85. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258–
59 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that the Court’s decision in Sosa establishes the “principle 
that the scope of liability for ATS violations should be derived from international 
law”). 
 86. Id. at 255. 
 87. Id. at 255. 
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statement that his research revealed no source of international 
law that would not impose liability for a mens rea of purposeful 
assistance.88 In reliance on Judge Katzmann’s opinion, the 
Court observed that “the purpose standard has been largely 
upheld in the modern era, with only sporadic forays in the 
direction of a knowledge standard,”89 and ultimately, concluded 
that “the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability in 
ATS actions is purpose rather than knowledge.”90 
After deciding that the proper mens rea standard for aiding 
and abetting is purpose, the court applied this standard to the 
facts of the case.91 First, the court held that “[e]ven if Talisman 
built roads or improved the airstrips with the intention that the 
military would also be accommodated,” the evidence of such 
coordination with the military “supports no inference of a 
purpose to aid atrocities.”92 Second, the court held that the 
plaintiffs did not allege the forced displacement of populations 
to be a violation of international law.93 The court further noted 
that such displacements may not constitute a violation of 
international law “because a government has power to regulate 
use of land and resources.”94 
Furthermore, the court noted that it is “not enough for 
plaintiffs to establish Talisman’s complicity in depopulating 
areas . . . plaintiffs must establish that Talisman acted with the 
purpose [of assisting] the Government’s violations of customary 
international law.”95 Thus, because the court found that 
Talisman did not purposefully aid the government in the 
perpetration of crimes against humanity, it affirmed the district 
 
 88. Id. at 258. 
 89. Id. at 259 (citing Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 276 (Katzmann, J., concurring)). 
The Court explains “sporadic forays” by noting that “some international criminal 
tribunals have made overtures toward a knowledge standard” but the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court adopts a purpose standard. Id. 
 90. Id. at 259. 
 91. Id. at 260–64. 
 92. Id. at 262. See also id. (“Talisman helped build all–weather roads and 
improved airports, notwithstanding awareness that this infrastructure might be 
used for attacks on civilians.”). 
 93. Id. at 263. (“Plaintiffs . . . do not allege that such displacement in itself is a 
violation of international law.”) 
 94. Id. Earlier in the opinion, however, the court accepts a definition of crimes 
against humanity as: “murder, enslavement, deportation or forced transfer, torture, 
rape or other inhumane acts, committed as part of a widespread [or] systematic 
attack directed against civilian populations.” Id. at 257 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 670). 
 95. Id. at 263. 
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court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Talisman.96 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR 
DETERMINING INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW FOR THE 
PURPOSES OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE ATS 
When ascertaining the scope of liability for a corporate 
defendant in a civil claim brought pursuant to the ATS, it is 
appropriate for courts to derive the applicable liability standard 
from international criminal law.97 ATS case law does not 
support the proposition that sources of international criminal 
law must be ignored for purposes of establishing civil liability 
under the ATS.98 To the contrary, several cases specifically look 
to international criminal norms to ascertain the scope of civil 
liability.99 Furthermore, in international law there is not a 
“hermetic seal” between criminal and civil law.100 Justice Breyer 
noted this fact in his concurring opinion in the Sosa case when 
he stated that “the criminal courts of many nations combine 
civil and criminal proceedings, allowing those injured by 
criminal conduct to be represented, and to recover damages, in 
the criminal proceeding itself.”101 Additionally, because 
 
 96. Id. at 247–48. 
 97. Compare Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 268–269 
(Katzmann, J., concurring) (defining scope of liability under ATS by reference 
international law, rather than federal common law) with id. at 286 (Hall, J., 
concurring) (using federal common law to define ATS liability). 
 98. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 270 n.5 (criticizing the holding of the lower 
court that international criminal law was not a proper source for determining a civil 
standard under the ATS). 
 99. See id.; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241–243 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(relying upon a United Nations Declaration and other instruments stating that 
genocide was a crime under international law. The court also relies on the 
Nuremberg trials to establish individual liability for war crimes, notwithstanding 
that the Nuremburg trails were criminal proceedings); Filartiga v. Pena–Irala, 630 
F.2d 876, 882–883 (2d Cir. 1980) (analyzing the Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from Being Subject to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N. GAOR, 30th 
Sess., Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/1034, at 91 (December 9, 1975), which requires 
states to initiate criminal proceedings if it appears that torture has been committed, 
in a case brought under the ATS). 
 100. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 270 n.5. See also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 
932, 949 (9th Cir. 2002) (“International human rights law has been developed 
largely in the context of criminal prosecutions rather than civil proceedings.”), 
vacated 395 F.3d. 978, appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403 F.3d 708. 
 101. Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762–63 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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customary international law is typically enforced through 
domestic legal regimes, it is the prerogative of the national legal 
system to decide whether to enforce this law “through criminal 
prosecutions, civil liability, or administrative remedies.”102 
Therefore, customary international law norms of criminal law 
provide the appropriate basis upon which to base a standard for 
determining civil liability under the ATS. 
B. DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS REGARDING AIDING 
AND ABETTING LIABILITY 
1. Nuremburg Trials 
In Talisman, the Second Circuit stated that “international 
law at the time of the Nuremburg trials recognized aiding and 
abetting liability only for purposeful conduct.”103 However, this 
assertion is patently erroneous. In fact, the standard established 
in the cases prosecuting German war criminals at Nuremburg 
clearly establish, in aggregate, that liability for war crimes and 
genocide can result from “knowingly providing substantial 
assistance in the commission of these crimes.”104 Moreover, this 
knowledge test was not merely limited to military defendants.105 
 
 102. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Organizations and Bar 
Associations in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l 
Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 05–2141–cv) [hereinafter Brief Amicus 
Curiae International Rights Organizations] (citing Beth Stephens, Translating 
Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for 
International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2002)). See also Brief 
Amicus Curiae of International Law Scholars Philip Alston et al. in Support of 
Appellants at 1–2, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 
2007) (No. 05–2141–cv) [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae of International Law 
Scholars] (stating that “[i]nternational legal norms do not specify the means of their 
domestic enforcement . . . the cause of action under the [ATS] is a creature of the 
common law, not the law of nations per se.”). 
 103. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 
(citing The Ministries Cases). See United States v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries 
Cases), 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBURG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 622 (1949) (“[I]s it a crime to make a loan, 
knowing or having good reason to believe that the borrower will us [sic] the funds in 
financing enterprises which are employed in using labor in violation of . . . 
international law? Does he stand in any different position than one who sells 
supplies or raw materials to a builder building a house, knowing that the structure 
will be used for an unlawful purpose? . . . [W]e are not prepared to state that such 
loans constitute a violation of that law, nor has our attention been drawn to any 
ruling to the contrary.”). 
 104. Brief Amicus Curiae of International Law Scholars, supra note 102, at 17. 
 105. See Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), 1 LAW 
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The Nuremburg Tribunal clearly accepted a knowledge 
standard for corporate officers tried for their actions aiding the 
Nazis. This fact is demonstrated by three cases. First, in the 
trial against German industrialists who were in charge of the 
I.G. Farben chemical company, the Nuremburg Tribunal 
unambiguously adopted a knowledge standard.106 In this case, 
the defendants were indicted on multiple charges, including 
crimes against peace, plunder of private property and crimes 
against humanity for their role in rearming the German 
army.107 For both of these counts the Nuremburg Tribunal used 
personal knowledge as the touchstone in determining the 
liability of the defendants.108 Although the Nuremburg Tribunal 
found that the defendants did not have sufficient knowledge of 
the German war plans to ascribe liability for crimes against 
peace,109 it found that individuals in the company had 
knowingly participated in acts of plunder and spoliation.110 The 
 
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 101 (1947) (“The essential question  was 
whether the accused knew of the purpose to which their gas was being put . . . . 
Prosecuting Counsel . . . concluded that, by supplying gas, knowing that it was to be 
used for murder, [the owner of the gas-supplying firm, his second in command, and 
the first gassing technician] had made themselves accessories before the fact to that 
murder.”). 
 106. Trial of Carl Krauch and Twenty Two Others (The I.G. Farben Trial), 10 
LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 52 (1948) (“[O]ne may not utilize 
the corporate structure to achieve an immunity from criminal responsibility for 
illegal acts which he directs, counsels, aids, orders, or abets. But the evidence must 
establish action of the character we have indicated, with knowledge of the essential 
elements of the crime.’”) 
 107. See Jacobson, supra note 65, at 178–86. 
 108. See id. at 183 (“To be convicted, the corporate official that authorized an 
illegal action had to know those essential elements of the authorized act which give 
it its criminal character . . . this means positive knowledge that the owner is being 
deprived of his property against his will during military occupancy.”) (citation 
omitted); id. at 179; The I.G. Farben Trial, 10 LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS 36 (1948) (“[P]articipation in the rearmament of Germany was not a 
crime on the part of any of the defendants in this case, unless that rearmament was 
carried out, or participated in, with knowledge that it was a part of a plan or was 
intended to be used in waging aggressive war.) But see The I.G. Farben Trial, 10 
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 44 (defining civilian plunderers under a 
military occupation as principles, not accessories, to a violation of international law) 
(“Where private individuals . . . exploit the military occupancy by acquiring private 
property against the will and consent of the former owner, such action . . . is in 
violation of international law.”) 
 109. See The I.G. Farben Trial, 10 LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS 36–37 (1948) (“If we were trying military experts, and it was shown that 
they had knowledge of the extent of rearmament, such a conclusion might be 
justified.”); see also Jacobson, supra note 65 at 183. 
 110. See Jacobson, supra note 65 at 183. 
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Nuremburg Tribunal unequivocally stated that the basis of 
liability for aiding and abetting actions of the principal was 
knowledge that their actions furthered the atrocities that were 
committed when it stated that the acts of “Farben and its 
representatives . . . cannot be differentiated from the acts of 
plunder or pillage committed by officers, soldiers, or public 
officials of the German Reich.”111 
Second, in United States v. Flick, commonly known as The 
Flick Case,112 two German industrialists were charged with 
aiding the activities of the SS through monetary contributions to 
Himmler.113 The Nuremburg Tribunal, after first affirming the 
criminal character of the SS in light of its responsibility for 
atrocities, held that “[o]ne who knowingly by his influence and 
money contributes to the support thereof must, under settled 
legal principles, be deemed to be, if not a principal, certainly an 
accessory to such crimes.”114 Thus, the Nuremburg Tribunal 
recognized aiding and abetting liability for merely contributing 
funds to an organization which the defendants knew was 
committing violations of settled international law.115 
The Nuremburg Tribunal’s reasoning in the Zyklon B case 
is especially important in the context of ATS litigation, where a 
corporation is almost always the defendant.116 The Zyklon B 
 
 111. The I.G. Farben Trial, 10 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 50 
(1948). 
 112. United States v. Flick (The Flick Case), 6 TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NURENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 1 
(1952). 
 113. Id. at 1216, 1218–20. 
 114. Id. at 1217.The Nuremburg Tribunal then explained that “there can be no 
force in the argument that when, from 1939 on, these two defendants were 
associated with Himmler and through him with the SS they could not be liable 
because there had been no statute nor judgment declaring SS a criminal 
organization and incriminated those who were members or in other manner 
contributed to its support.” Id. at 1217. The defendants argued that they were not 
aware of such activities and that they believed that the finds they contributed to 
Himmler were used only to fund his “cultural hobbies.” Id at 1219. Nevertheless, the 
Nuremburg Tribunal finds that the criminal character of the SS “must have been 
known.” Id at 1220. 
 115. See id. at 1216–17, 1218–19. 
 116. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 
244 (2d Cir. 2009); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 
2007); Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003); Doe I v. 
Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 949 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated 395 F.3d. 978, appeal 
dismissed per stipulation, 403 F.3d 708; Bigio v. Coca–Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d 
Cir. 2000). But see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 06–4800–cv, 2010 WL 
3611392 (2d Cir. Sept., 17, 2010) (holding that corporations are not liable under the 
ATS) 
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case illustrates the inherent problem of using a purpose 
standard when assessing liability for defendants whose ultimate 
aim is profit, but this profit is pursued by aiding severe human 
rights abuses. In this case, the owner and two employees of a 
company that produced Zyklon B gas were charged with war 
crimes for supplying the poisonous gas which was used in the 
mass execution of people in concentration camps.117 The 
prosecution: 
did not attempt to prove that the accused acted with the intention of 
assisting the killing of the internees. It was accepted that their 
purpose was to sell insecticide to the SS . . . The charge as accepted by 
the court was that they knew what the buyer in fact intended to do 
with the product they were supplying.118 
The fact that two of the defendants in the Zyklon B case 
were ultimately convicted based on their knowledge of how of 
the gas was to be used is unequivocal evidence that the 
Nuremburg Tribunal accepted knowledge as an appropriate 
basis upon which aiding and abetting liability could be 
ascribed.119 
Unfortunately, these cases are wholly overlooked by the 
Second Circuit in its Talisman decision despite the factual 
similarity of these cases and Talisman. For instance, it is 
arguable that allowing the government to use the corporation’s 
airports as rally points in the orchestration of armed attacks 
against civilians and providing other support for such 
activities120 is analogous to providing gas for use on prisoners in 
concentration camps or supporting an organization that is 
known to commit atrocities through monetary contributions. 
Additionally, as the reasoning of the Nuremburg Tribunal in 
Zyklon B seems to suggest, the use of a purpose mens rea 
standard for corporate defendants is unworkable because the 
ostensible purpose of a business will almost always be the 
pursuit of profits and not to aid the government in the 
 
 117. See Jacobson, supra note 65, at193–96. 
 118. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 238 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) , aff’d, 
Case No. IT–95–17/1–A (July 21, 2001) (asserting without citation). 
 119. See Jacobson, supra note 65, at 195. Contra id. at 194–95 (quoting Trial of 
Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS 107 (1947)) (“If [defendant] were not in such a position [“to 
influence the transfer of gas to Auschwitz or to prevent it”], no knowledge of the use 
to which the gas was being put could make him guilty.”). 
 120. See supra Part I.A.3. 
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commission of war crimes.121 
Based on the foregoing examples, the Nuremburg Tribunal 
unambiguously ascribed aiding and abetting liability to both 
military and civilian defendants based on a knowledge 
standard, and even went as far as inferring knowledge of the 
principal’s criminal intent in certain situations.122 Therefore, the 
Second Circuit patently erred in its finding that the Nuremburg 
Tribunal only recognized aiding and abetting liability for actions 
undertaken with the purpose of providing substantial assistance 
in accomplishing its criminal objective.123 
2. ICTY and ICTR Decisions 
In his concurring opinion in Khulumani, Judge Katzmann 
acknowledged in a footnote that decisions of the ICTY and ICTR 
have accepted a mens rea standard of knowledge for aiding and 
abetting liability.124 Nevertheless, Judge Katzmann argues that 
this standard has not reached the same “level of consensus as 
the 18th-century crimes identified by the Supreme Court in 
Sosa.”125 However, as demonstrated below, the great weight of 
ICTY and ICTR decisions on individual responsibility for aiding 
and abetting consistently find that the customary international 
 
 121. See Beth Stevens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and 
Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 46 (2002) (“Profit-maximization, if not 
the only goal of all business activity, is certainly central to the endeavor. And the 
pursuit of profit is, by definition, an amoral goal –– not necessarily immoral, but 
rather morally neutral.”). 
 122. See Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), 1 LAW 
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 101 (1947) (“The essential question  was 
whether the accused knew of the purpose to which their gas was being put 
. . . . Prosecuting Counsel . . . concluded that, by supplying gas, knowing that it was 
to be used for murder, the three accused had made themselves accessories before the 
fact to that murder.”); The I.G. Farben Case, 10 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS 16 (1948).(“In these circumstances the question arose whether the 
accused could be shown to have had personal knowledge of the criminal intentions of 
the German Government to wage aggressive wars and, if so, whether they were 
parties to the plan or conspiracy, or, knowing, of the plan, furthered its purpose and 
objective by participating in the preparation for aggressive war. The Prosecution in 
their attempt to prove the existence of such knowledge and active participation, 
drew attention to the high positions held by the accused as well as to a great number 
of facts and circumstances from which such knowledge and participation in their 
view may be inferred.”). 
 123. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 
259. 
 124. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 276 n.12 (2d Cir. 
2007). 
 125. Id. at 277 n.12. 
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law standard is knowledge, not purpose. Furthermore, because 
these tribunals are only empowered to apply standards that are 
indisputably part of customary international law, their 
judgments should be given significant deference in ascertaining 
appropriate aiding and abetting standards.126 
a. ICTY 
In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the ICTY acknowledged that the 
scope of its power is limited to applying international law that is 
“beyond any doubt customary law.”127 Pursuant to this mandate, 
the ICTY reviewed many different sources of customary 
international law to determine the appropriate standard for 
aiding and abetting liability.128 Ultimately, the mens rea 
standard which the tribunal determined to be beyond any doubt 
customary law is conduct by the defendant when he “knowingly 
participated in the commission of an offense that violates 
international humanitarian law and his participation directly 
and substantially affected the commission of that offence . . . He 
will also be responsible for all that naturally results from the 
commission of the act in question.”129 
In Prosecutor v. Furundzija, the Trial Chamber was once 
more required to determine the appropriate mens rea for aiding 
and abetting liability.130 In this case, the tribunal yet again 
reviewed pertinent international law131 and concluded that: 
[I]t is not necessary for the accomplice to share the mens rea of 
the perpetrator in the sense of positive intention to commit the crime. 
 
 126. See Brief Amicus Curiae of International Law Scholars, supra note 102, at 
18. 
 127. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT–94–1–T, Opinion and Judgment of the 
Trial Chamber, ¶ 662 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) 
(quoting U.N. Secretary–General, Report of the Secretary–General pursuant to 
paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 808 (1993) and Annex thereto, ¶ 34, U.N. 
Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993)). 
 128. The tribunal finds the decisions of the Nuremburg tribunals to be 
particularly persuasive but also analyzes the Code Penal, used in the French war 
crimes trial after World War II, and the International Law Draft Code. Id. at ¶¶ 
663–69, 668. 
 129. Id. at ¶ 692. 
 130. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 245 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998), aff’d, 
Case No. IT–95–17/1–A (July 21, 2001). 
 131. Here the Tribunal again finds the decisions of the Nuremburg tribunals to 
be persuasive and also takes into account the ILC’s Draft Code on Crimes and 
Offences Against Mankind and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. Id. ¶ 236–243. 
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Instead, the clear requirement in the vast majority of the cases is for 
the accomplice to have knowledge that his actions will assist the 
perpetrator in the commission of the crime.132 
If, after reviewing the relevant sources of customary law, 
the ICTY determined that the “vast majority” of the sources 
impose liability for aiding and abetting based on a mens rea 
standard of knowledge, there seems to be little support for 
Judge Katzmann’s assertion that such a standard has not 
reached the same level of consensus as the 18th—century 
crimes identified in Sosa for the purpose of ATS litigation.133 
Likewise, in Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, the Appeals Chamber 
of the ICTY weighed in on the issue of the requisite mens rea for 
aiding and abetting liability.134 The ICTY found that aiding and 
abetting the commission of a crime is typically considered a 
lesser degree of individual culpability than actually perpetrating 
the crime and thus a broader mens rea than purpose is 
appropriate.135 Therefore, in the case of aiding and abetting, the 
“requisite mental element is knowledge that the acts performed 
by the aider and abettor assist the commission of the specific 
crime of the principal.”136 
The Vasiljević case confirms that the ICTY has conclusively 
adopted a knowledge standard for aiding and abetting, 
reflecting the ICTY’s belief that this standard is beyond any 
doubt the customary law standard. Furthermore, the Vasiljević 
case, along with several other ICTY cases adopting the mens rea 
standard of knowledge for aiding and abetting, were decided 
after the Rome Statute of the ICC was adopted.137 In fact, the 
 
 132. Id. ¶ 245. See also id. ¶ 246 (“[I]t is not necessary that the aider and abettor 
should know the precise crime that was intended and which in the event was 
committed.”). 
 133. See Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 725 (2004) (“[C]ourts should require 
any claim based on the present–day law of nations to rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable 
to the features of the 18th–century paradigms we have recognized.”) 
 134. Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT–98–32–A, Appeal Chamber Judgment, 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Feb 25, 2004). 
 135. See id. ¶102 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id.; Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No. IT–02–60–T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 782 (Jan. 17, 2005) (“An individual may be held responsible for aiding 
and abetting genocide if it is shown that he assisted in the commission of the crime 
in the knowledge of the principle perpetrator’s specific intent.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, 
Case No. IT–98–33–A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 134–43 (Apr. 19, 2004) (vacating 
Krstić’s conviction for taking part in a joint criminal enterprise but imposing 
liability for aiding and abetting because “Krstić was aware of the intent to commit 
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tribunal specifically referenced the Rome Statute in 
Vasiljević.138 This is significant because Judge Katzmann and 
the Second Circuit in Talisman rely heavily on the fact that the 
Rome Statute seemingly mandates a purpose standard for 
aiding and abetting liability.139 However, the ICTY specifically 
rejected purpose as the required mens rea even after the Rome 
Statute’s enactment.140 This fact greatly undermines the Second 
Circuit’s reliance on that instrument in Talisman. 
b. ICTR 
The ICTR also addressed the issue of the appropriate mens 
rea standard for aiding and abetting in Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu.141 There, the ICTR concluded that an individual can be 
held liable for aiding and abetting crimes against humanity if he 
“knowingly aided or abetted or instigated one or more persons in 
the commission of genocide, while knowing that such a person or 
persons were committing genocide.”142 Furthermore, the 
tribunal explained that aiding and abetting are two separate 
types of offenses and that a defendant can be held liable for 
either when it stated that “aiding means giving assistance to 
someone. Abetting, on the other hand, would involve facilitating 
the commission of an act by being sympathetic thereto . . . 
[E]ither aiding or abetting alone is sufficient to render the 
perpetrator criminally liable.”143 
Additionally, the aider and abettor would not need to 
knowingly provide aid with the desire that a crime occur in 
order to be held liable.144 Even if the aider and abettor did not 
wish for the crime to occur, or even regrets that it has occurred, 
 
genocide . . . and with that knowledge, he did nothing to prevent the use of the Drina 
Corps personnel and resources to facilitate those killings.”). 
 138. See Vasiljević, IT–98–32–A ¶ 102 (discussing how the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court distinguishes between a common criminal plan or 
enterprise and aiding and abetting). 
 139. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 
(2d Cir. 2009) (discussing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). 
 140. See Vasiljević, IT–98–32–A ¶ 102. 
 141. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR–96–4–T, Judgement (Sept. 2, 1998), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CAkayesu%5Cjudgement%5Cak
ay001.pdf. 
 142. Id. ¶ 545. 
 143. Id. ¶ 484. 
 144. Id. ¶ 539 ([A]nyone who knowing of another’s criminal purpose, voluntarily 
aids him or her in it, can be convicted of complicity even though he regretted the 
outcome of the offence.”). 
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he or she is liable if they were willing to aid the principal for 
other motives.145 This standard should be particularly applicable 
to corporations because the corporation may not wish for the 
violations of international law to occur but may be more willing 
to knowingly aid the principal in pursuit of profits or other 
favorable concessions. 
3. The ILC Draft Code and Rome Statute 
The ILC Draft Code, promulgated in 1996, was considered 
persuasive in several of the ICTY decisions in which the 
tribunal attempted to determine the appropriate mens rea 
standard for aiding and abetting liability in international law.146 
Moreover, the ICTY deemed the ILC Draft Code an 
“authoritative international instrument.”147 The ILC Draft code 
specifically addresses the mens rea standard for aiding and 
abetting in Article 25.148 Article 25 states that a person will be 
responsible for a violation of international law if that person 
“[k]nowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and 
substantially, in the commission of such a crime, including 
providing the means for its commission.”149 Despite the fact that 
the ILC Draft Code clearly lays out the requisite mens rea 
standard required for aiding and abetting liability and has had 
a significant authoritative influence, particularly in the ICTY, 
neither Judge Katzmann nor the Second Circuit even consider 
the Draft Code in their analysis.150 
Only two years after the ILC adopted a “knowingly” aids or 
abets standard in the Draft Code, in 1998 the Rome Statute 
seemingly adopted a purpose standard.151 Article 25(3)(c) states 
that an individual will be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment if that person “for the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of a [crime within the jurisdiction of the court], aids, 
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted 
 
 145. Jacobson, supra note 65, at 205. 
 146. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT–98–33–A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 
134–43 (Apr. 19, 2004); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T, Trial 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 238 (Dec. 10 1998) at 242–244. 
 147. Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T ¶ 227. 
 148. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 2, ¶ 
3 (1996). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 250–
51 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 151. See Cassel, supra note 53, at 310. 
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commission, including providing the means for its 
commission.”152 Judge Katzmann and the Second Circuit rely 
heavily on this language as the basis for their conclusions that 
aiding and abetting under international law requires a mens rea 
of purpose.153 
However, Judge Katzmann and the Second Circuit fail to 
address a separate provision of Article 25 which provides an 
alternative basis of liability. Article 25(3)(d) concerns crimes 
committed by a “group of persons” acting with a “common 
purpose.”154 It provides that anyone who contributes to the 
commission of a crime by this group of persons “with the aim of 
furthering the criminal activity” or with the “knowledge of the 
intention of the group to commit the crime” will be held 
criminally responsible.155 Thus, the Rome Statute “embraces a 
‘knowledge’ test as sufficient to impose criminal responsibility 
on one who aids and abets a group crime.”156 Therefore, the 
reliance of the Second Circuit on the Rome Statute establishing 
the requisite expression of customary law to support a purpose 
mens rea for aiding and abetting in ATS cases is severely 
undermined. 
4. State Practice 
a. Australia 
In Australia, as a result of laws adopted pursuant to its 
obligations under the Rome Statute, criminal accessory liability 
attaches to a corporation when it acts as an aider or abettor.157 
A similar standard of aiding and abetting applies to civil actions 
in Australia and liability extends to any person “besides the 
actual perpetrator . . . who ‘aid and abets,’ whether or not he 
actively intervenes. Knowingly assisting, encouraging or merely 
 
 152. Rome Statute, supra note 80, at art. 25.3(c). For a thorough discussion of 
the drafting and ratification history of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court see Cassel, supra note 53, at 310–14. 
 153. See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 258–59; Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 277 
(Katzmann, J. concurring). 
 154. Rome Statute, supra note 80, at art. 25.3(d). 
 155. Rome Statute, supra note 80, at art. 25.3(c); see also Cassel, supra note 53, 
at 313. 
 156. Cassel, supra note 53. 
 157. See Adam McBeth, Crushed by an Anvil: A Case Study of Responsibility for 
Human Rights in the Extractive Sector, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 127, 149–52 
(2008). 
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being present as a conspirator at the commission of the wrong 
would suffice.”158  Therefore, Australian civil law is plainly in 
accord with the customary international standard of applying a 
mens rea standard of knowledge for aiding and abetting 
liability.159 
b. United States 
In Military Commission Instruction (MCI) No. 2, the United 
States recognized that international law specifically defines the 
scope of aiding and abetting liability. Although the jurisdiction 
of MCI No. 2 extends only to offenders who are triable in a 
military commission,160 this articulation of aiding and abetting 
liability should be considered as persuasive by courts 
determining the scope of such liability under the ATS. The MCI 
constitutes a form of State practice and the document purports 
to be “declarative of the existing law” of armed conflict.161 
Furthermore, because the actions at issue in the Talisman case 
occurred during a period of civil war in the Sudan,162 they 
occurred during a period of armed conflict, thus making the 
aiding and abetting standard enunciated in MCI No. 2 
particularly relevant when assessing Talisman’s liability under 
the ATS.163 According to MCI No. 2, aiding and abetting consists 
of “in any . . . way facilitating the commission” of an offense, 
with knowledge the act would aid or abet.164 Hence, according to 
United States law, a showing of knowingly aiding and abetting 
would result in liability under Military Commission Instruction 
No. 2 and should also be sufficient to demonstrate liability 
under the ATS.165 
 
 
 158. Lillian Manzella, EarthRights International, The International Law 
Standard for Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability 8, available at 
http://www.earthrights .org/publication/unsrg-international-law-standard-corporate-
aiding-and-abetting-liability at 16 (quoting J. Fleming, THE LAW OF TORTS 230). 
 159. See McBeth, supra note 157 at 139.. 
 160. Military Commission Instruction No. 2, art. 3(a) (2003), available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/dod/d20030430milcominstno2.p
df. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id., Part I.A.1. 
 163. See id.(as the law of armed conflict). 
 164. Military Commission Instruction No.2, art. 6(c)(1) (2003), available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/dod/d20030430milcominstno2.p
df. 
 165. Id. 
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c. South Africa 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
recognized culpability for those that were complicit in the 
apartheid regime.166 This Commission unequivocally extended 
culpability for the human rights violations that occurred under 
the apartheid system based on a mens rea of knowledge.167 For 
example, the Commission found high-ranking government 
officials in the executive branch to be morally and politically 
responsible for the human rights violations committed under 
the apartheid system due to the “knowledge they had . . . or the 
knowledge they are presumed to have had . . . about the gross 
violations of human rights.”168 Those companies that actively 
aided in the design and implementation of apartheid policies 
were guilty of the highest level of culpability.169 However, those 
that knew that their products or services would be used for 
repression, such as banks and weapons manufacturers, were 
also found to be guilty of involvement in the apartheid regime 
and morally culpable for its atrocities.170 Hence, in accord with 
the customary international law standard, the Commission held 
corporations culpable when they knowingly provided practical 
assistance, encouragement, or moral support to those principals 
who were engaged in violations of international law.171 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Talisman, the Second Circuit was called upon to 
determine the appropriate mens rea standard for aiding and 
abetting under the ATS. According to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Sosa, causes of action brought under the ATS must 
be based on customary international law. Thus, the ATS 
provides federal courts with the jurisdiction to hear such 
disputes and customary international law provides the cause of 
action. Relying substantially on Judge Katzmann’s concurring 
 
 166. See 6 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, REPORT, 
§ 5 ch. 2, ¶ 17 (2003) [hereinafter TRC REPORT]. 
 167. Id. ¶ 17(b). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Manzella, supra note 158, at 9 (citing 4 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, REPORT, ch. 2 (1998) (noting that Commission 
classified different levels of culpability for businesses complicit in the apartheid 
regime). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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opinion in Khulumani, the Second Circuit came to the erroneous 
conclusion that aiding and abetting under international law 
requires a mens rea of purpose. In fact, customary international 
law dictates that a mens rea of knowledge is all that is required 
for aiding and abetting liability. 
This conclusion is supported by the decisions of 
international tribunals, such as the Nuremburg Tribunals 
following World War II and the more recent ICTR and ICTY, in 
cases concerning both individual and corporate defendants. 
Additionally, international instruments such as the ILC Draft 
Code explicitly state that the appropriate mens rea is knowledge 
rather than purpose. Although the Rome Statute of the ICC 
purportedly endorses a purpose mens rea standard, a fact relied 
upon heavily by the Second Circuit, another section of the Rome 
Statute creates an alternative basis of liability for complicity 
based on knowledge. Furthermore, several of the States that 
have addressed the issue have concluded that knowledge is the 
appropriate mens rea standard for aiding and abetting. 
Ultimately, a mens rea standard of knowledge is established by 
customary international law as the requisite for aiding and 
abetting liability. Therefore, for the purposes of ATS litigation, 
courts should apply a knowledge mens rea when assessing 
liability for aiding and abetting. 
 
